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The Eleventh Circuit correctly rejected the application of the doctrine in Long (discussed and further explained in this article). The taxpayer had transferred a vertical slice of his property, i.e., he did not retain a temporal interest in it.
The right transferred was an appreciated equitable interest in property. Furthermore, he had not sold "the future right to earned income" but rather "the future right to earn income." By any reasonable methodology for determining if the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should apply, it is clear that in Long it should not.
In general, the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should not be utilized in circumstances where there has been a transfer involving a vertical

I. INTRODUCTION
The substitute for ordinary income doctrine often serves as an additional, judicially formulated limitation beyond the explicit statutory exceptions set forth in § 1221 to capital asset status. It is therefore an impediment on what has been colorfully described as "the golden road to capital gain treatment."
1
The substitute for ordinary income doctrine essentially provides that in certain, but not all, cases the "right to receive payments that would be ordinary income if received in due course is taxed on the substitute payment as ordinary income rather than as capital gain."
2 Determining when the doctrine should apply has proven at times difficult to discern.
Professors Boris Bittker and Lawrence Lokken have opined that " [u] nless and until Congress establishes an arbitrary line on the otherwise seamless spectrum between [substitute for ordinary income] . . . transactions and conventional capital gain transactions, the courts must locate the boundary case by case. . . ." 3 There have, however, been analytical guidelines provided by some courts and scholars to aid this endeavor, which this article will consider. 4 In Long v. Commissioner, 5 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the government's attempt to apply the substitute for ordinary income doctrine to the sale of plaintiff's rights in a civil action. Long was a condominium developer who was scheduled to close on the purchase of land. When the seller unilaterally attempted to terminate the agreement, Long brought an action for specific performance and other damages. He won at trial court, but the seller appealed. Prior to the appeal being decided, Long transferred his
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Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview. 2016 .46 | http://taxreview.law. pitt.edu rights to a third party for a lump-sum payment, which the government asserted should be treated as ordinary income pursuant to the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. As explained below, the Eleventh Circuit was correct in denying the government's arguments for employing the doctrine to this fact-pattern. Long serves as an avenue for examining under what circumstances should the substitute for ordinary income doctrine apply. The objective of this article is to analyze some key methodologies advanced for determining when the doctrine should and should not be utilized, and then to evaluate the decision in Long in light of these approaches. Because of the voluminous amount of decisions and other sources on this subject, coverage is somewhat limited.
II. CAPITAL GAIN TREATMENT
For individual taxpayers, characterizing a transaction as generating long-term capital gain instead of ordinary income can produce a major tax benefit. For example, an individual in the highest bracket faces a top federal tax rate generally on "net capital gain" 6 of twenty percent instead of 39.6% for ordinary income. 7 In order to obtain the favorable tax treatment, there must be: (1) a sale or exchange, (2) of a capital asset, (3) that was held for more than one year. 8 A capital asset is defined indirectly in § 1221 as "property held by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include . . ." eight specified types of assets delineated in § 1221(a)(1)-(8) . In terms of what constitutes "property" for purposes of § 1221, the Supreme Court has construed the word "property" in the statute "narrowly."
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Pitt Tax Review | ISSN 1932-1821 (print) 1932-1996 (online) DOI 10.5195/taxreview. 2016 .46 | http://taxreview.law. pitt.edu principle rather than a restriction as to what is considered "property" in the definition of a capital asset. 15 For example, as discussed below, the Supreme Court in Hort v. Commissioner, 16 a leading decision in this area, implied that it was a stand-alone doctrine when it denied capital asset status to a lease that it determined was indeed "property." In any event, the issue of whether the doctrine should be viewed as a type of constraint on what is property under § 1221 was specifically addressed in a footnote by a more recent Supreme Court decision. In footnote five to its decision in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 the Supreme Court observed that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine is "based on the premise that § 1221 'property' does not include claims or rights to ordinary income. . . ." 18 This conclusion has been further supported in other decisions subsequent to Arkansas Best. For example in Womack v. Commissioner, 19 a case discussed at length below, the Eleventh Circuit noted that "in deciding that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies, we necessarily find that Lottery Rights do not constitute 'property' as that term is used in Section 1221."
20
For many years, prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Best, 21 there was also considerable controversy as to whether the Court in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner 22 intended to create another judicially fashioned exception to capital gain treatment, i.e., to deny capital 15 One treatise notes in this regard that
[i]n most of the cases considering the issue of whether the proceeds from the sale of a contract are capital gains or ordinary income, there is little or no explicit reference to the issue of whether the contract was "property" within the meaning of § 1221. Instead, these cases have addressed the question of whether or not the proceeds should be considered a substitute for what would have been income to the seller. asset status if the asset was held for a business purpose. 23 In Arkansas Best, however, the Court cleared up this confusion by stating "that Corn Products is properly interpreted as involving an application of § 1221's inventory exception" 24 and then concluding that "a taxpayer's motivation in purchasing an asset is irrelevant to the question whether the asset is 'property held by a taxpayer (whether or not connected with his business)' and is thus within § 1221's general definition of 'capital asset. '" 25 In sum, the substitute for ordinary income doctrine is a canon created by the courts which serves to limit the scope of the word "property" in § 1221, and thus, where appropriate, to deny capital gain treatment on the sale or exchange of certain assets even though such assets are not encompassed within any of the statutory exclusions listed in § 1221(a)(1)-(8). It is not, however, the only restraint placed on the term "property" to restrict the scope of capital asset status, as exemplified by the Second Circuit's decision in Miller.
26
III. SUBSTITUTE FOR ORDINARY INCOME DOCTRINE
A. The Supreme Court Roots of the Substitute for Ordinary Income Doctrine
While its derivation can perhaps be traced to Burnet v. Harmel 27 and other early Supreme Court cases, the first landmark substitute for ordinary income case before the Court was Hort v. Commissioner. 28 In Hort, the taxpayer inherited from his father a lot and ten-story office building, part of which was leased to a bank, the Irving Trust Co. In 1933, Irving Trust Co., having found it unprofitable to maintain a branch in the taxpayer's building 23 For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2, at ¶ 47.9.3. 24 Arkansas Best, 485 U.S. at 220. 25 Id. at 223. 26 Miller v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 706 (2d Cir. 1962 ), cert. denied, 370 U. S. 923 (1962) . 27 Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932) (holding that the cash bonus the lessor received upon executing an oil and gas lease was not taxed as gain from the sale of capital assets, but ordinary income equivalent to advanced rent). 28 to deny (a) capital treatment and (b) an offsetting basis, to one who disposes of a right to future income which has been carved out of a larger estate. In effect, the sale of an income right, unaccompanied by a disposition of the underlying property, results in ordinary income to the seller equal in amount to the entire proceeds of the sale. 35 29 Id. at 30. The taxpayer actually reported a loss on the transaction. The taxpayer's "theory [was] that the amount he received as consideration for the cancellation was $21,494.75 less than the difference between the present value of the unmatured rental payments and the fair rental value of the main floor and basement for the unexpired term of the lease." Id. at 29. 30 Id. at 31. 31 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940) . Horst, a prominent assignment of income case, is also cited and examined by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, 356 U. S. 260 (1958) , discussed below. In P.G. Lake, the Court described the Horst fact pattern as follows: "the taxpayer detached interest coupons from negotiable bonds and presented them as a gift to his son. The interest when paid was held taxable to the father." 356 U.S. at 267. 32 Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U. S. 461 (1940) . 33 Hort, 313 U.S. at 31. 34 Id. at 32. 35 
38
The decision involved five cases that were consolidated for argument, which entailed an identical question of law. The legal issue in P.G. Lake was whether consideration received by the taxpayer in return for the assignment of oil payment rights, or in one case sulfur payment rights, was taxable as ordinary income or capital gain.
The facts of the namesake case in P.G. Lake were as follows: the taxpayer was a corporation engaged in the business of producing oil and gas that had a seven-eighths working interest in two commercial oil and gas leases. In satisfaction of a debt owed to the taxpayer's president, the taxpayer "assigned him an oil payment right in an amount of $600,000 plus an amount equal to interest at three percent a year on the unpaid balance. . . ."
39
The taxpayer treated the transfer of this oil payment right as a sale of property 36 Id. at 423-24; Thomas G. Sinclair suggested that
[t]he [Hort] decision could have narrowed the substitute-for-ordinary income doctrine at its inception by limiting its application to carved-out interests. If the owner of the asset retained some interest in it, he would receive ordinary income; but, if he completely disposed of the asset, then he would avoid the doctrine. The Court in P.G. Lake concluded that " [t] he substance of what was received was the present value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income, not for an increase in the value of the incomeproducing property."
44
In their leading article regarding the P.G. Lake decision, Professors Charles S. Lyon and James S. Eustice observed that "Lake represents a powerful and pervasive influence, already apparent in several recent lower court decisions, against the attempt to convert future rights to ordinary 40 Id. at 266. 41 Id. at 265. 42 Id. (footnote omitted). 43 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 35, at 435. 44 P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 266. The results of Lake were, however, impacted by § 636, enacted in 1969, after Lake was decided. Michael Graetz and Deborah Schenk point out that pursuant to § 636,
[t]he sale of a carved-out production payment is treated as a loan. The seller remains taxable on the income from the oil produced and is entitled to deductions for depletion. He can deduct the interest element of the payments. The purchaser of the payment is taxable only on the interest and cannot deduct depletion. An owner who sells a well and retains a production payment is treated as having made a sale subject to a mortgage. The purchaser is taxable on the proceeds of production and is entitled to depletion deductions. income into present capital gain through the device of a sale of these rights." 45 The decision has been viewed by some courts and commentators as having embraced the Service's position that, as described by Professor Louis A. Del Cotto: "[an] assignment of an oil payment right, no matter how long or short lived it may be, which extends over a period less than the life of the property interest retained by the transferor is an assignment of future ordinary income and will not receive capital gain treatment."
46
Using Justice Holmes' renowned fruit-tree metaphor from Lucas v. Earl, 47 Professor Del Cotto stated that the Court in P.G. Lake considered "the interest sold as 'fruit' rather than 'tree' and therefore, not a capital asset."
48
The theory is that horizontal slices, i.e., situations in which "temporal divisions [are made] in a property interest in which the person owning the interest disposes of part of his interest but also retains a portion of it," 49 like the ones in P.G. Lake, are simply not "property" as the term was intended to be used by Congress in § 1221 and its predecessors.
Professor Del Cotto was of the opinion that in contrast to a horizontal slice, with "a so-called 'vertical slice'-that is, the entire interest of the assignor in the property or a fraction of his interest, extending over the entire life of the property-then a capital asset-the 'tree,' or a fractional part of it-will have been transferred."
50
As discussed below, well-thought-through judicial reasoning since then challenges this conclusion, i.e., vertical slices do not necessarily escape the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. That is, as illustrated by some of the lottery winnings assignment cases discussed 45 47 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930) . In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a husband was not permitted to shift his income to his wife through the use of a contract. Id. The Court would not uphold an "arrangement by which fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Id. at 115. This analogy was also famously embraced by Lyon & Eustice, supra note 45, at 303-04. 48 Del Cotto, supra note 46, at 18. 49 G . Lake] assumed few of the risks identified with the holding of a capital asset; he assumed only a nominal risk of his oil payment right decreasing in value and none of the possibility of the oil payment right increasing in value. On the other hand, the taxpayer, after the transfer, retained essentially all of the investment risks involved in his greater interest to the same extent as before the transfer. for its failure to put reasonable boundaries on the doctrine's reach. In Eidson, the Fifth Circuit reversed a trial court that had held that amounts received by taxpayers in consideration for the assignment of their rights under a management contract that they had with an insurance company was capital gain. Eidson held that the right to receive a percentage of the net profits from the operations of the business for the remainder of the contract was ordinary income.
In Dresser, the court observed that Eidson had illogically literally applied P.G. Lake's generalized language "to mean that any money paid which represents the present value of future income to be earned is always taxed as ordinary gains."
64
The Fifth Circuit, in Dresser, reasoned that the court in Eidson failed to appreciate the fact "[t]he only commercial value of any property is the present worth of future earnings or usefulness . . . [t]he value of a vending machine, as metal and plastic, is almost nil; its value arises from the fact that it will produce income."
65
The approach Dresser utilized for determining when the doctrine should be applied is discussed below. 62 United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963 ). 63 United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962 ). 64 Dresser, 324 F.2d 59. 65 Id. The importance of limiting the reach of the doctrine, because most assets generate ordinary income, was echoed by another academic, William A. Klein. Klein was quoted by the Third Circuit in Lattera, discussed below, that "[a] fundamental principle of economics is that the value an asset is equal to the present discounted value of all the expected net receipts from that asset over its life." Lattera, 437 F.3d at 404 (citing WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 786 (12th ed. 2000)). Similarly, Professor Douglas Kahn writes:
The value of any property is the present value of the income stream that the property is deemed capable of producing. The outright sale of any property (for example, corporate stock) can be seen as the sale of the income stream that that property will produce. So the purchase price for any property is a substitute for the income that the property can produce. Obviously, the fact that the payment represents a substitute for the future income that the property can produce does not prevent the seller from qualifying for capital gain treatment and for utilizing his basis in the property.
Kahn, supra note 4, at 450. The Court distinguished the taxpayer's right to compensation for the use of its facilities from the facilities themselves. The Supreme Court stated that this "right is not something in which respondent had any investment, separate and apart from its investment in the physical assets themselves."
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The Court found that "[i]n short, the right to use is not a capital asset, but is simply an incident of the underlying physical property, the recompense for which is commonly regarded as rent."
71
This case was undoubtedly correctly decided, too. The taxpayer assigned a horizontal slice retaining the underlying property. The taxpayer's income was the equivalent of rent for the limited use of the taxpayer's business facilities and should be taxed as such.
The fourth major Supreme Court case concerning this subject matter was United States v. Midland-Ross Corp. 72 In Midland-Ross, the taxpayer bought noninterest-bearing promissory notes discounted below the face amounts and then sold them after holding the notes for more than the six months statutory requirement for long-term capital gain treatment. The sales, which occurred before the notes maturity, were for more than their issue price 66 Comm'r v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U. S. 130 (1960) . 67 Id. at 130. 68 Id. at 133 (emphasis in original). 69 Id. at 134. 70 Id. at 135. 71 Id. but less than their face amount. 73 The Court held the gain to be ordinary income and not capital gain.
The Court, in Midland-Ross, cited approvingly its observation from Gillette Motor that "not everything which can be called property in the ordinary sense and which is outside the statutory exclusions qualifies as a capital asset."
74
The Supreme Court further reasoned that "this Court has consistently construed 'capital asset' to exclude property representing income items or accretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly attributable to income." The Supreme Court stressed that " [u] nlike the typical case of capital appreciation, the earning of discount to maturity is predictable and measurable, and is 'essentially a substitute for . . This decision was certainly properly decided also. The income clearly represented interest for the use of money and should be taxed as such, i.e., ordinary income. While courts and scholars often cite Midland-Ross along with Hort, Lake and Gillette Motor as the significant foundational cases for the doctrine, there were key distinctions between Midland-Ross from the other cases. 78 While these four Supreme Court decisions are certainly essential for understanding the substitute for ordinary income doctrine, lower court decisions and other observations by commentators, discussed below, are critical for analyzing both when to apply the principle and whether the 73 The case was decided under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, before the enactment of the current statutory treatment of original issue discount, as set forth in § 1271. 74 Midland-Ross, 381 U.S. at 56 (quoting Gillette Motor, 364 U.S. at 134). 75 Id. 76 Id. at 57 (quoting Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940)). 77 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hort, 313 U.S. at 31). 78 Professor Del Cotto observed that in Midland-Ross "there is no sale of 'future income' and a retention of the 'property' since the transferor has parted with his entire interest in the property." Del Cotto, supra note 46, at 25.
Eleventh Circuit was correct in rejecting its application in Long v. Commissioner .
B. Some Other Notable Decisions Serving to Clarify the Scope of the Doctrine
While the Second Circuit decision Commissioner v. Ferrer 79 did not refer to the substitute for ordinary income doctrine per se, it remains a very notable case in understanding when to employ the doctrine. This is because of Judge Friendly's noteworthy analysis in distinguishing circumstances in which a taxpayer was and was not entitled to capital gain treatment upon the surrender of contract rights. 80 In Ferrer, the taxpayer, actor Jose Ferrer, received certain payments with respect to the motion picture "Moulin Rouge" about the artist Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec. The court examined the nature of the rights released and determined that while the transfer of two rights resulted in capital gain treatment, a third right conveyed should be treated as ordinary income.
Ferrer had entered into a contract with Pierre LaMure, the author of both the novel "Moulin Rouge" and the play "Monsieur Toulouse," based on the novel. Pursuant to the contract, Ferrer obtained three key rights with respect to the novel and play that were relevant to the case: (1) "'the sole and exclusive right' to produce and present . . 83 Id. 84 
Id.
85 Eustice, supra note 1, at 5. 86 Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 130.
The Second Circuit commented that "[i]n all these cases the taxpayer had something more than an opportunity, afforded by contract, to obtain periodic receipts of income, by dealing with another . . . or by rendering services . . . or by virtue of ownership of a larger 'estate. '" 87 While not germane to the applicability of whether the assets transferred should have been treated as capital assets, the Second Circuit in Ferrer rejected some prior case law that distinguished between a sale to a third person and a release to the grantor in determining whether the "sale or exchange" requirement of § 1222 was satisfied. In this regard, the court asserted that "we can see no sensible business basis for drawing a line between a release of Ferrer's rights to LaMure for a consideration paid by Moulin, and a sale of them, with LaMure's consent, to Moulin or to a stranger who would then release them."
88
The court further observed that the "[t]ax law is concerned with the substance, here the voluntary passing of 'property' rights allegedly constituting 'capital assets,' not with whether they are passed to a stranger or to a person already having a larger 'estate. '" 89 The Second Circuit next analyzed the three important rights Ferrer ceded and determined that the first two transfers were each entitled to capital gain treatment, but that relinquishment of the 40% share of proceeds of the motion picture predicated on the production of the play was ordinary income. As to the first right, the surrender of Ferrer's lease of the play, the court, without using the phrase "substitute for ordinary income," explained its lack of relevance. The Second Circuit opined that "[w]e see no basis for holding that amounts paid Ferrer for surrender of his lease of the play are excluded from capital gain treatment because receipts from the play would have been ordinary income."
90
In this regard, the court equated the Ferrer fact-pattern with a lessee who received payment for terminating its lease, which property it had either subleased (and thus received rental income) or received business income from its use. In these situations, the termination of the lease should 87 Id. 88 Id. at 131. 89 Id. 90 Id. at 132. not result in ordinary income. 91 As Professor Eustice observed, "Ferrer's exclusive use of the dramatic rights was a speculative property interest in a copyright . . . [and] Ferrer sold his entire interest in the transferred property, so the 'carving out' problem in the Lake and Hort cases was absent here." 92 Thus, the transfer of the first right can be viewed as that of a vertical slice.
As to the second right that Ferrer surrendered, his negative power to prevent disposition of the of motion picture, television and radio rights, the Second Circuit again found capital gain treatment appropriate. The court characterized this right as an "'equitable interest' in [a] portion of the copyright."
93
The court, in its determination that capital gain treatment was appropriate, again analogized to a lessor/lessee fact-pattern. The Second Circuit stated that a "tenant's relinquishment of a right to prevent his landlord from leasing to another tenant in the same business . . . [was] held to be the sale or exchange of a capital asset."
94
The court also emphasized the presence of an equitable remedy to enforce this right. 91 Id. There is thus a distinction between payments a lessor receives for lease termination as in Hort, and payments made to a lessee upon this event. Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak comment that some authorities have argued that the distinction is that "[i]n the lessee's hands, it is said, the leasehold is a substantial interest in real estate, not merely a claim to future income." CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 35, at 440. They believe, however, that the best . . . reason for [distinguishing between the lessor and lessee upon a lease termination] resides in the presence (in one case) and the absence (in the other case) of the familiar carving out. Once again, a lessor who disposes of his interest in a lease still owns the underlying income-producing property-land or building-after the disposition. He therefore retains the ability, on the expiration of the lease, to repeat the process, on making an advance disposition of his right to future rentals. If such advance dispositions were accorded capital gain treatment, then all of the property-owner's rental income could be converted into capital gain.
Id. (emphasis in original)
. 92 Eustice, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 93 Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 133. 94 Id. The scope of Ferrer in according capital gain treatment to the relinquishment of contract rights was substantially limited by the Tax Court in Bellamy v. Commissioner, 43 T. C. 487 (1965) . In that case, the actor, Ralph Bellamy, claimed capital gain treatment on the sale of his rights under a contract to prevent the distribution and showing of certain films. The court stated that
[w]hile the right which the petitioner granted to Revue to distribute and show the films might, in the ordinary sense, be characterized as a property right, he had no investment therein, aside from the services which he had performed in connection with the making of the films, and hence such right had no cost basis in his hands.
With respect to the third right given up by Ferrer, 40% of the motion picture proceeds if he produced "Monsieur Toulouse," the Second Circuit determined that ordinary income treatment was proper. The court noted that with respect to this claim, "Ferrer was to 'have no right, title or interest, legal or equitable, in the motion picture rights, other than the right to receive the Manager's share of the proceeds' . . . he was to have 'no recourse, in law or in equity' . . . but only a right to arbitration against the Author."
95
In
98
There was, however, risk and opportunity with respect to this third right. In this respect it differs from e.g., the lottery winning installment transfer cases discussed below, where the amount to be received in the form of an annuity is known in advance and the only risk is that of being a creditor of the payer. That is, in Ferrer, "the amount of such income [from the third right Ferrer could have earned had it not been released] was subject to a future contingency that the third person would and could profitably exploit his Id. at 498. The court further stated that the facts in the Ferrer case are substantially different from those obtaining here. There the right which was transferred was incidental to a property interest, namely, the "lease" of the play, in which the taxpayer had an investment, and was not a right stemming from a contract of employment. Clearly the amount in question in the instant case did not represent, to any extent, consideration for the transfer of any property interest comparable to that involved in the Ferrer case.
Id. at 499-500. 95 Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 134. 96 Id. 97 
Id.
98 Eustice, supra note 1, at 9.
property." 99 Thus, while the substitute for ordinary income doctrine can apply to transfers for consideration representing the present value of a fixed payments to be received in the future, such as the lottery winnings installment sales cases discussed below, it can also apply when the future payment is contingent. For example, if one sells his ticket in a horse race, halfway through the race when his horse is ahead for a fixed amount the payment should be ordinary income, i.e., the doctrine should apply.
As with the lottery winnings cases, with respect to this third right in Ferrer, "all events had been performed by Ferrer which were necessary for him to 'earn' the basic right to his income. . 
101
In Dresser, the Fifth Circuit rejected the government's attempt to apply the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. In that case, the taxpayer had entered into an agreement with Well-Surveys, Inc., which granted the taxpayer a license to utilize its patent for work the taxpayer did for third parties. Several years later, a taxpayer and Well-Surveys, Inc. entered into a new agreement pursuant to which the taxpayer relinquished its exclusivity rights under the original contract and received in return $500,000 "to be paid out of one quarter of the fees earned by practice of the patent to third parties."
102
In its finding that the taxpayer was entitled to capital gain treatment, the Fifth Circuit stated that the "[t]axpayer had an asset, a right, a property which would produce income. The fact that the income, which could be earned would be ordinary income is immaterial; such would be true of the sale of all income-producing property."
103
The court in Dresser initially observed that the case was not a horizontal slice wherein the taxpayer continued to retain rights to the property transferred. The court stated "[t]he taxpayer here is cutting off a 'vertical slice' of its rights, rather than carving out an interest from the totality of its Very importantly, the court in Dresser enunciated a major demarcation as to when and when not to apply the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. The Fifth Circuit stated that " [t] here is, in law and fact, a vast difference between the present sale of the future right to earn income and the present sale of the future right to earned income."
105
The Dresser fact-pattern was one in which there was both a vertical slice and a "future right to earn income."
106
Under these circumstances, the court appropriately concluded the doctrine was inapplicable. As discussed below, however, there are decisions where the doctrine was held to apply even where the taxpayer met the criteria of both selling "the future right to earn income" and at least arguably having transferred a vertical slice. 107 It would seem, however, that the better answer is the doctrine should generally be inapplicable in circumstances where the foregoing criteria are met and is coupled with the taxpayer having transferred an appreciated equitable interest in property. 104 Id. at 58. 105 Id. at 59 (footnote omitted). The following language in Judge Brown's concurring opinion in Dresser is also worth noting:
But although this sales price is determined by future earnings, and to the seller it takes the place of what he would have received had he continued his ownership, under no stretch of the imagination is it "ordinary income" either in the business world or in the sometimes more weird, tax world. Were this so, then every such sale for a price in excess of cost would entail this analysis and this tax consequence.
Id. at 61. 106 Id. at 59. 107 Id.; see, e.g., Foote v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 930 (1983) (wherein a professor's relinquishment of tenure rights was treated as a substitute for ordinary income despite the fact that a vertical slice had been transferred because tenure only gave him the right to earn income in the future). As to the latter point, the case applied to years before § 1234A became effective. Section 1234A provides, in pertinent part, that
[g]ain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of-(1) a right or obligation (other than a securities futures contract, as defined in section 1234B) with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer . . . shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.
A recent case concerning whether the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should be employed is Tempel v. Commissioner. 108 In Tempel, the taxpayers argued that gains from the sale of their transferable Colorado income tax credits, obtained from the donation of a qualified conservation easement, were entitled to long-term capital gain treatment. One of the Service's arguments for its position that such benefits should be denied was that these sales had resulted in ordinary income pursuant to the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. The court held the doctrine inapplicable but the taxpayers' victory on this issue proved Pyrrhic because the Tax Court found the capital gain to be short-term. 109 The Tax Court, in its analysis as to whether capital gain treatment was proper, decided initially that the Colorado tax credits were not contract rights and should not be analyzed as such in determining whether capital gain treatment was appropriate. 110 The court stated that " [t] here is nothing in the in determining whether the taxpayer's contract rights that were transferred constituted a capital asset, courts generally consider all aspects of the bundle of rights and responsibilities of the taxpayer that were transferred, specifically including the following six factors: (1) How the contract rights originated; (2) How the contract rights were acquired; (3) Whether the contract rights represented an equitable interest in property which itself constituted a capital asset; (4) Whether the transfer of contract rights merely substituted the source from which the taxpayer otherwise would have received ordinary income; (5) Whether significant investment risks were associated with the contract rights and, if so, whether they were included in the transfer; and (6) Whether the contract rights primarily represented compensation for personal services. . 1 3 2 0 1 6 | O r d i n a r y I n c o m e D o c t r i n e | 1 The court next opined that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine was inapplicable to the taxpayers' situation. This was, the court reasoned, because the credits could only be utilized to obtain a refund if Colorado produced a budget surplus which it had not in 2004 (the year the credits were sold) or 2006-10. 112 Furthermore, the Tax Court observed that had the taxpayers themselves used the credits, this "reduction in a tax liability [ 1 7 6 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 
C. Lessons from the Lottery Decisions
There are a series of relatively recent cases that have treated the sale of lottery winning installment payments for a lump sum as ordinary income under the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. While the outcomes of these decisions appear obvious, there are useful insights drawn from some of the court opinions and commentary in this area, which provide considerable assistance in determining when the doctrine should be employed.
In Womack v. Commissioner, 118 the taxpayer had won a portion of the Florida State Lottery ("Florida Lotto") and collected annual installments for a few years until Florida changed its law permitting winners to assign their Florida Lotto rights. He reported the annual installments as ordinary income. In 2000, he sold his Florida Lotto rights to a third party for $1.328 million. He reported this as long-term capital gain which was disallowed by the Service.
The Eleventh Circuit commented that "four Circuits have reviewed the precise legal question we face here under materially identical circumstances. Each Circuit has concluded that Lottery Rights are substitutes for ordinary income, but came to this conclusion in different ways."
119
As to its own reasoning and conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit in Womack stated that:
[w]e agree with our sister circuits that Lottery Rights are a clear case of a substitute for ordinary income. A lottery winner who has not sold the right to his winnings to a third party must report the winnings as ordinary income whether the state pays him in a lump sum or in installments. 120 The court further opined that "Congress did not intend for taxpayers to circumvent ordinary income tax treatment by packaging ordinary income payments and selling them to a third party."
121
The court observed that "any 'gain' from their sale reflects no change in the value of the asset. It is simply the amount Taxpayers would have received eventually, discounted to present value."
122
This fact-pattern contrasted with that in Dresser. 123 That is "when a lottery winner sells Lottery Rights, he transfers a right to income that is already earned, not a right to earn income in the future."
124
These lottery cases, even those involving vertical slices, are the poster child for when the doctrine should be applied, i.e., an almost risk-free right involving income already earned with no upside potential for the transferee. The Fifth Circuit specifically distinguished Dresser, noting that "when a lottery winner sells Lottery Rights, he transfers a right to income that is already earned, not a right to earn income in the future."
125
The Eleventh Circuit also observed that "income from a lottery payment is earned income despite the fact that it does not accrue until the scheduled annual payment date."
126
The Eleventh Circuit in Womack joined a number of other courts in its rejection of the taxpayer's contention that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine was significantly limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Arkansas Best. 127 In its dismissal of the taxpayer's interpretation of footnote five in Arkansas Best as support for its position, the court indicated that "[i]t in no way implies that the Court applied the substitute for ordinary income doctrine narrowly, nor hints that the Court would confine the doctrine to the facts of the cases it cites."
128
The court in Womack also rebuffed the taxpayer's argument for claiming capital gain treatment under the theory that lottery rights should constitute "property" under § 1221 because they "are property in the ordinary sense of 122 
Id.
123 United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56, 57 (5th Cir. 1963 ). 124 Womack, 510 F.3d at 1302. 125 Id. 126 Id. 1 7 8 | P i t t s b u r g h T a x R e v i e w | V o l . 1 3 2 0 1 Commissioner, 132 which also held for the Service in its treatment of the assignment of lottery income rights as ordinary income. In 1991, the Latteras had won close to ten million dollars in the Pennsylvania lottery and were required at that point to take the prize in 26 annual installments. Upon receiving the required court approval, in 1999 they sold their rights to the remaining seventeen lottery payments, which they reported as capital gain. The Service determined the proper treatment was ordinary income.
Just as in Womack, the court dismissed the taxpayer's assertion that the substitute for ordinary income doctrine "did not survive Arkansas Best." The court in Lattera emphasized that it was utilizing a different methodology from some other lottery winnings transfer cases, especially an earlier decision by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Maginnis, whether the substitute for ordinary income doctrine applies to a particular fact-pattern, it was necessary to do a "case-by-case analysis . . . [and] At the opposite end of the spectrum, the court pointed out "are several types of rights that we know to be ordinary income, e.g., rental income and interest income."
141
The Third Circuit asserted that in analyzing a particular circumstance to determine whether the doctrine should be applied, one should look as to whether there is a "family resemblance" to the aforementioned categories. The Third Circuit commented that "for example, we presume that stock, and things that look and act like stock, will receive capital-gains treatment."
142
For cases lacking a "family resemblance," the Third Circuit observed, "like contracts and payment rights, we use two factors to assist in our analysis: (1) type of 'carve-out' and (2) character of asset." 139 Lattera, 437 F.3d at 406. 140 Id. The court added to this category "physical assets like land and automobiles." Id. For this purpose the court obviously ignored the carve-out from capital asset treatment contained in § 1221(a)(2), i.e., "property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his trade or business." I.R.C. § 1221(a)(2). 141 Id. 142 Id. With respect to vertical carve-outs, the court gave as examples situations in which "the lottery winners sold the rights to all their remaining lottery payments," 147 which was the fact-pattern in Lattera. The Third Circuit pointed out that vertical carve-outs do not always generate capital gains as was illustrated e.g., by Womack and other cases in which the taxpayer had assigned all his remaining lottery rights. The court stated that in vertical carve-out fact-patterns one must "proceed to the second factor-character of the asset-to determine whether the sale proceeds should be taxed as ordinary income or capital gain."
148
As to "the character of the asset" test, the court in Lattera instructed that " [a] ssets that constitute a right to earn income merit capital-gains treatment, while those that are a right to earned income merit ordinary-income treatment."
149
This was the lesson from Dresser, i.e., "there is, in law and fact, a vast difference between the present sale of the future right to earn income and the present sale of the future right to earned income."
150
The Third Circuit provided termination payments for personal service contracts as an example of circumstances where ordinary income treatment is proper. In those circumstances, the "employee still possesses the asset (the right to provide certain personal services) and the money (the termination 144 Id. at 407 (quoting Sinclair, supra note 36, at 401). 145 Id. See Lake, 356 U.S. at 264; Hort, 313 U.S. at 32. 148 Lattera, 437 F.3d at 407. 149 Id. at 408. 150 Id. at 407 (quoting Dresser, 324 F.2d at 59). fee) has already been 'earned' and will simply be paid." 151 This is discussed further below. Another example the court gave as a "right to earned income" was the third right surrendered in Ferrer, discussed above, 40% of the motion picture proceeds etc. if Ferrer produced "Monsieur Toulouse." This was "a right to earned income-thus ordinary-income treatment was indicated."
152
The court in Lattera then applied its analytical framework to the case at bar, and concluded that ordinary treatment was proper. The court reasoned that: the right to receive annual lottery payments does not bear a strong family resemblance to either the "capital assets" or the "income items" listed at the polar ends of the analytical spectrum. The Latteras sold their right to all their remaining lottery payments, so this is a vertical carve-out, which could indicate either capital-gains or ordinary-income treatment. But because a right to lottery payments is a right to earned income (i.e., the payments will keep arriving due simply to ownership of the asset), the lump-sum payment received by the Latteras should receive ordinary-income treatment. 153 It should be noted that the court in Lattera commented in a footnote, The Lattera decision is, as Susan Simmonds wrote, "an opinion destined for law school casebooks." 160 Lattera's framework for determining the application of the doctrine, while neither infallible nor immune to criticism, 161 appears conceptually sound and should serve as a means for analyzing future cases. The methodology in Lattera is certainly, as Professor Timothy R. Koski observed, "a step in the right direction."
162
As indicated above, the Third Circuit in Lattera was critical of the reasoning, but not the holding, of Maginnis. As with the fact-patterns in Womack, Lattera and Prebola, the taxpayer in Maginnis had won a lottery, started receiving annual payments, and then subsequently assigned his right to future income to a third party for a lump-sum payment. The Ninth Circuit in Maginnis, like the other courts, held the income to be ordinary income. 158 Id. at 611. (2006) . 161 While Professor Douglas Kahn agreed with the court's conclusion, he rejected the Third Circuit's analysis "that only if the transferee of the right to the income must do something further to earn the income can the seller have capital gain treatment." Kahn, supra note 4, at 455 (citing Lattera, 437 F.3d at 408). Professor Kahn observed that under the Lattera court's reasoning the sale of shares of stock would produce ordinary income . . . .
[O]n the sale of stock, the purchaser obtains the right to future income (dividends) solely by virtue of owning the stock; he need do nothing further to obtain the dividends. The tax treatment of the sale of stock cannot be reconciled with the construction of earned income that the court adopted.
Kahn, supra note 4, at 455-56. I believe Professor Kahn's criticism in this regard is perhaps unwarranted. Stock would not fall under the character of the asset test the Lattera court framed because it would have been accorded capital gain treatment under the court's initial "family resemblance" test. Lattera also observed that its standards might not have universal application, commenting that "we recognize that any rule we create could not account for every contemplated transactional variation." Lattera, 437 F.3d at 405.
The court's analysis, however, was different. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that ordinary income treatment was appropriate because "Maginnis (1) did not make any underlying investment of capital in return for the receipt of his lottery right, and (2) the sale of his right did not reflect an accretion in value over cost to any underlying asset Maginnis held."
163
The court asserted that:
[b]ecause Maginnis did not make any capital investment in exchange for his lottery right-because there was no "cost" in the relevant sense to Maginnis for the right to receive accrued future payments from the Oregon lottery-the money he received for the sale of his right cannot plausibly be seen as reflecting an increase of value above the cost of any underlying capital asset . . . the sale of Maginnis' lottery winning . . . lacks the requisite "realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time" that is typically necessary for capital gains treatment. 164 The Maginnis' analysis was criticized by the Third Circuit in Lattera and by some commentators. The court, in Lattera, opined that: "[t]he first factor-underlying investment of capital-would theoretically subject all inherited and gifted property (which involves no investment at all) to ordinary-income treatment."
165
Lattera was also disparaging of the second factor offered by the court in Maginnis. The Third Circuit, in Lattera, stated that "[n]ot all capital assets experience an accretion in value over cost. For example, cars typically depreciate, but they are often capital assets. . . ." 166 On this one point, Lattera's criticism may not be apposite. Was it the intention of Congress to bestow favorable tax treatment for a long-term capital gain in circumstances where taxpayer was not transferring an asset with an "appreciation in value?" 167 The consideration received by the Maginnis' and the others for assigning their lottery payment rights was equal in value to what they gave up. There was no economic gain, unless one compares the cost of the lottery ticket with what was ultimately received. This, however, would require the original yearly payments to qualify for capital gain treatment which, of course was not being asserted. In the case of a gift of property with built-in gain, there is appreciation in value of the possession even if the asset's worth does not increase further in the hands of the donee. Maginnis makes a valid assertion about the necessity of value appreciation for capital gain characterization. It is a sine qua non for this favorable tax treatment.
The Ninth Circuit in Maginnis also commented that an additional rationale for not according capital gain treatment to the assignment is that "treating the sale of Maginnis' lottery right as a capital gain would reward lottery winners who elect to receive periodic payments in lieu of a direct lump sum payment from the state, and then sell that payment right to a third party."
168
This too makes sense.
Maginnis, just as the courts did in Womack and Lattera, dispensed with the taxpayer's argument that Arkansas Best "largely invalidated the substitute for ordinary income doctrine." The same conclusion was also reached in another, but 168 Id. at 1184. 169 Id. at 1185. 170 
Id.
171 Watkins v. Comm'r, 447 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006) . 172 Id. at 1273. 173 Id. unpublished, Tenth Circuit decision, Wolman v. Commissioner, 174 in which the taxpayer sold his remaining lottery annual payments for two lump sum payments.
The identical right result was reached by the Tax Court, in Clopton v. Commissioner, 175 where the taxpayer transferred some, but not all, lottery installment rights contained in a trust, thus creating a horizontal slice situation, in which part of the property rights were retained. From the court's reasoning, however, it appears that the taxpayer would and should have had ordinary income treatment, even if there had been a vertical slice.
The court decisions holding that a transfer of all or part of a taxpayer's right to future lottery winning installment payments should be denied capital gain treatment under the substitute for ordinary income doctrine were undoubtedly correct. They all fell under the ordinary income wing of the Dresser delineation as "the present sale of the future right to earned income" instead of the "present sale of the future right to earn income."
176
There was not an appreciation in value, i.e., the transfer price represented the present value of what the assignees would have received in the future had they kept their rights, less the assignees' profit. Finally, while certainly not dispositive of the treatment, the amount of income the assignee was to receive was known and its only risk was a potentially unlikely default by the payer of the lottery installments and the transferee had no possibility of an upside to its purchase.
The reasoning of some of the decisions in this area, notably Lattera, provides useful guidance about the scope of the doctrine in other settings. 
D. Personal Service Contracts
The substitute for ordinary income doctrine has been widely applied by the courts to payments made to terminate a contract for personal services. 177 As noted, the Tax Court explicitly referenced as one of the six factors to focus on in determining whether transfers of contract rights were capital assets, " [w] hether the contract rights primarily represented compensation for personal services." is illustrative of the treatment by the courts in this area. In that case, the taxpayer, acting as an independent contractor, served as a promotional and sales representative for a pharmaceutical company, Rowell Laboratories, Inc. He had a long-term contract to represent the company in certain specified territories. An agreement was reached between the parties to terminate the agreement pursuant to which $216,000 was to be paid in monthly installments of $1,500 to the taxpayer. In the years at issue, 1965-67, the taxpayer treated the $18,000 received as capital gain. The Tax Court agreed with the Service that the amounts should be treated as ordinary income. The court stated that the taxpayer: simply released to Rowell the right to represent Rowell in a given territory and to receive commissions on the sales of Rowell's products within that territory. Those commissions would have been taxable to petitioner as ordinary income. The payments petitioner did receive under the termination agreement were simply a substitute for the income he would have received for performing personal services under the contract and the fact that under the termination agreement petitioner did not have to perform services does not convert the personal services contract which petitioner relinquished into a capital asset. during the course of the agreement it became apparent to Paramount that the market for the type of movies taxpayer produced was falling. Under the termination agreement, no more motion pictures were to be produced, and the taxpayer's partnership received a lump sum payment of $153,000, which the taxpayer had argued was entitled to capital gain treatment. The Ninth Circuit, in its rejection of the taxpayer's position, stated that: "[i]t is well settled that a right to receive future income which is commuted into a lump sum payment results in ordinary income just as the income if actually received in the future in several payments would be ordinary income." conveyed to an insurance company by an insurance agent upon his termination. The Eighth Circuit observed that the "courts have quite uniformly held that contracts for the performance of personal services are not capital assets and that the proceeds from their transfer or termination will not be accorded capital gains treatment. . . ." 185 In Trantina v. United States, the Ninth Circuit decided against the taxpayer's claim for capital gain treatment in another case that involved termination payments made under a personal services contract to an insurance broker. 186 In its analysis, the court did not specifically refer to the application of the substitute for ordinary income doctrine. Instead, the court determined that the contract the taxpayer's company had with the insurance company gave the brokerage "no property that could be sold or exchanged."
187
The Ninth Circuit also rebuffed the taxpayer's assertion that capital gain treatment was apposite "because he made a 'substantial economic investment in the Agreement' that 'increased over the years.'"
188
The taxpayer's investment, he had asserted, was "the economic opportunity 182 Id. at 690-91. 183 Vaaler v. United States, 454 F.2d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir. 1972 In personal service contract cases, like Foote, in which the taxpayer relinquished his right to earn income in the future, perhaps a valid basis for applying the doctrine is that there has not been a vertical slice. As discussed below, this is predicated on viewing the transaction as a bifurcation of the transferor's property rights, whereby Professor Foote and similarly situated taxpayers are seen as retaining rights to provide comparable services to others in the future.
Professors Marvin Chirelstein and Lawrence Zelenak reflected as to why the courts have consistently treated payments made for the surrender of personal service contracts as ordinary income, even in situations where they meet at least some of the criteria used in other circumstances to find capital 189 Id. 190 
Id.
191 Foote v. Comm'r, 81 T. C. 930 (1983) . 192 Id. at 935. 193 
asset status was met. 194 They observed that "it seems likely that the courts have been influenced chiefly by the feeling that employment and personal service is simply not an appropriate context for capital gain." 195 This is somewhat analogous to the Lattera "family resemblance" test, i.e., anything related to compensation should characterized as ordinary income.
Another reason Professors Chirelstein and Zelenak offered was that the service provider upon contract termination is now "free to accept similar employment elsewhere." 196 If considered as such, there has not been a vertical slice, because the taxpayer has preserved a temporal right in the property. They analogized the service provider to the lessor in Hort. They commented that: "[i]f ordinary income was required to be recognized in Hort (for reasons relating generally to the carved-out interest limitation), perhaps the same principle justifies ordinary treatment for employees (i.e., lessors of services) when an employment contract is terminated." 197 Professor David F. Shores expressed dissatisfaction with some of case law that applied the doctrine in certain circumstances to the termination of personal service contracts. 198 He maintained that:
the Lake rationale clearly should not control the cancellation of an employment contract which involves a complete termination of all economic interests in the contract. Under such circumstances, even-handed treatment of wage earners and property owners demands capital gain treatment for the termination payment except to the extent that it constitutes payment for past services. 199 Thomas G. Sinclair shared Professor Shores' discomfort with what they both view as expansive treatment of the doctrine to personal services 194 There is an exception to ordinary income treatment in this area in circumstances where taxpayer's "business activities enable them to create entitlements going beyond the right to be paid for past or future services." BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 2, at ¶ 47.9.4 (footnote omitted). That is, the taxpayer has created an asset such as personal goodwill that he is conveying. 195 CHIRELSTEIN & ZELENAK, supra note 35 at 441. 196 Id. at 442. 197 
198 Shores, supra note 59, at 495. 199 
contracts. 200 Sinclair asserted that "the right to terminate or sell a contract has a separate value subject to appreciation." 201 That is, personal services contracts "have an inherent value that is subject to market appreciation." 202 For example, locking in a pharmaceutical representative like Flowers to a long-term arrangement could certainly benefit the company if the cost for comparable services were to go up in the marketplace. Sinclair was especially critical of the courts not distinguishing between the right to earned income and the right to earn income in this area.
In summary, the arguments for ordinary income treatment in this area seem to be based on: (1) the absence of a vertical slice, (2) the inappropriateness of according capital gain treatment to anything in the compensation family sphere, and (3) lack of economic appreciation of the asset, e.g., the tenure rights in Foote. While the position espoused by Shores and Sinclair is certainly not without merit, there are compelling reasons to support the courts' characterization of such income as ordinary.
IV. LONG V. COMMISSIONER
Philip Long, the taxpayer who acted pro se in Long v. Commissioner , was a condominium developer in the Fort Lauderdale, Florida area. His apparent lack of organization and straight forwardness in his tax returns and court filings do not cast him as a very sympathetic figure. He also failed to file appellate briefs in support of his positions.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, reversed the Tax Court 203 in part. The Court of Appeals held that a payment received in 2006 from the assignment of his position as a plaintiff in a lawsuit that he had won at trial, but was being appealed, should be treated as capital gain, not ordinary income. 204 damages in connection with a contract to purchase land. The Eleventh Circuit specifically rejected the government's argument to apply the substitute for ordinary income doctrine to this matter.
The key facts were as follows: Long had formed Las Olas Tower Company, Inc. ("LOTC") in 1994 to design and build a luxury high-rise condominium called the Las Olas Tower in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He was LOTC's president and sole shareholder. LOTC had never filed a corporate tax return, nor had a valid employer identification number, and its income was reported on Long's individual tax return in Schedule C. 205 The condominium was to be built on land to be purchased from Las Olas Riverside Hotel ("LOR"). Id . Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit also upheld the Tax Court's decision that Long's evidence regarding a deduction for unaccounted legal fees was insufficient. Id. 205 The government in its brief to the Eleventh Circuit noted that while there was no evidence that Long has elected S corporation status, since the Commissioner did not challenge Long's treatment of LOTC as an unincorporated business on his return he had "thus implicitly allowed an S election." Brief for the Appellee at 39, Long v. Comm'r, 772 F.3d 670 (11th Cir 2014) (No. 14-10288).
While the presence of risk and opportunity in the assignment is certainly not dispositive of whether the doctrine applies, as noted above, the Tax Court has indicated that in deciding if transferred contract rights were capital assets one needs to consider "[w]hether significant investment risks were associated with the contract rights and, if so, whether they were included in the transfer."
231
In Long, the rights purchased were certainly not devoid of risk or opportunity. If the appeal had not been subsequently dropped, there could well have been a reversal, and if so, Ferris' $5.75 million investment might become worthless. On the other hand, by virtue of the purchase, Ferris might have hit the lottery. He could have developed the project or sold the rights to another party and in either event potentially earn significantly more than what he paid Long. By any reasonable methodology for determining if the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should apply, it is clear in Long that it should not. The government should have refrained from asserting the application of the doctrine in this case. Especially in circumstances where the taxpayer acts pro se, steering the court to correctly interpret the law should have taken precedence for the government over winning.
V. CONCLUSION
In general, the substitute for ordinary income doctrine should not be utilized in circumstances where there has been a transfer involving a vertical slice (in contrast with a horizontal slice) of an appreciated equitable interest in property conferring a future right to earn income (and not a future right to earned income). Where it is clear that the above criteria have been met, as was the case with Long, the government should generally eschew arguing for the doctrine's application.
